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Abstract:  
The paper investigates how comparisons of multivariate inequality can be made robust 
to varying the intensity of focus on the share of the population that are more relatively 
deprived. It follows the dominance approach to making inequality comparisons, as 
developed for instance by Atkinson (1970), Foster and Shorrocks (1988) and Formby, 
Smith, and Zheng (1999) in the unidimensional context, and Atkinson and Bourguignon 
(1982) in the multidimensional context. By focusing on those below a multidimensional 
inequality “frontier”, we are able to reconcile the literature on multivariate relative poverty 
and multivariate inequality. Some existing approaches to multivariate inequality actually 
reduce the distributional analysis to a univariate problem, either by using a utility function 
first to aggregate an individual’s multiple dimensions of well-being, or by applying a 
univariate inequality analysis to each dimension independently. One of our innovations 
is that unlike previous approaches, the distribution of relative well-being in one 
dimension is allowed to affect how other dimensions influence overall inequality. We 
apply our approach to data from India and Mexico using monetary and non-monetary 
indicators of well-being. 
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1 Introduction
In a recent review of the literature on multivariate inequality measurement,
Weymark (2004) concludes that “(...) Although much has already been learned
about multidimensional normative inequality indices, much more remains to be
discovered. Compared to the theory of univariate inequality measurement, the
analysis of multidimensional inequality is in its infancy.” (p.29) This paper is a
contribution to that young literature.
The method we develop and empirically apply is very much in the spirit of
Amartya Sen’s conceptual framework for thinking of inequality. In that frame-
work, it is important to make clear at the outset what one is comparing across
individuals (Sen 1982). The paper adopts the view that there can be several di-
mensions to well-being, and that comparisons of well-being across individuals
should therefore be multidimensional. In addition, in making normative judge-
ments on distributions of well-being, it is important to make explicit the ethical
norms that are used. This has been clearly argued in the context of measuring
both inequality and poverty (Sen 1973 and Sen 1976). The paper makes these
judgements explicit by using classes of multidimensional inequality indices that
are defined on the basis of explicit normative criteria.
In doing this, we build on the dominance approach to making
inequality comparisons, as developed for instance by Atkinson (1970),
Foster and Shorrocks (1988) and Formby, Smith, and Zheng (1999) in the uni-
dimensional context, and Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) in the multidimen-
sional context. One advantage of this approach is that it is capable of generating
inequality orderings that are robust over broad classes of inequality indices and
over broad classes of aggregation rules across dimensions of well-being.
We start with the framework for multivariate poverty comparisons developed
in Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006). Two modifications of that approach make
it suitable to inequality analysis. First, rather than consider absolute values of
multiple measures of well-being, we normalize them by a reference value, usually
their mean. The robust poverty comparisons of Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006)
thus become robust relative poverty comparisons. These can be of interest in their
own right (see for instance Sen 1983), but they also permit sensible analysis of
inequality if the poverty lines are allowed to span a suitably large range, extending
beyond the least deprived people in the population.
Second, by taking a relative poverty approach we are able to focus on “down-
side” inequality aversion. Specifically, we consider inequality indices that can
give greater weight to those positioned at the bottom of the well-being distribu-
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tion. This is done by focusing our comparisons on individuals below a multidi-
mensional poverty “frontier” that functions like a poverty line in a single dimen-
sion: people beyond this frontier do not contribute to relative poverty. In this
approach, inequality is the limiting case of relative poverty, the case in which the
poverty frontier is so far from the origin that everyone’s relative position in the
well-being distribution can have an impact on relative poverty. We show how our
orderings can also be considered to be “frontier-robust”.
It is of course possible to think of making multidimensional relative poverty
comparisons by performing univariate comparisons independently for each di-
mension of well-being. But that does not allow the level of well-being in one
dimension to influence our assessment of how other dimensions affect overall
relative poverty, something that we argue any reasonable multivariate compari-
son should consider. Thus, an important feature of the inequality and relative
poverty tests we develop is that they take into account the dependence between
two measures of well-being when making multivariate comparisons. This will
be important when that dependence is stronger for one population than it is for
another. In such cases, univariate comparisons carried out in each dimension sep-
arately can yield results that differ from the genuine multivariate comparisons
developed here. For example, population A may have lower univariate relative
poverty than population B for two measures of well-being χ and ξ. But if A also
has a greater dependence between χ and ξ, then it may also have higher bivariate
relative poverty than B despite the univariate differences. And of course, the op-
posite is also true. In practice, we find that one-at-a-time univariate comparisons
conclude that one population has lower inequality than another too easily, and that
it is relatively rare to find greater multivariate inequality in A than in B when we
do not find greater univariate inequality in A than in B.
It is ethically important to suppose that the dependence between dimensions
of well-being matters. In particular, someone who is relatively worse-off in terms
of ξ contributes more to the relative poverty and inequality measure if he is also
relatively worse-off in terms of χ. Without this conviction, one could just as well
study each dimension of well-being separately.
To highlight further the importance of the dependence between multiple mea-
sures of well-being, one of the key theoretical results of our paper is that if popu-
lation B has a greater covariance between the two dimensions than population A
does, it is impossible for B to dominate A at first or second order over the entire
domain of the joint distribution of relative well-being. Thus, it is impossible to
draw a robust conclusion that B has lower inequality than A at first and second
orders, regardless of the dispersions of the marginal distributions, though conclu-
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sions about relative poverty may still be possible. This gives a decisive role to the
covariance between dimensions of well-being; it is analogous to the role of the
mean in univariate generalized Lorenz comparisons, where a distribution with a
lower mean cannot stochastically dominate one with a greater mean regardless of
the dispersions of the two distributions (Shorrocks 1983).
We also extend our approach to making robust inequality comparisons both
in a relative and in an absolute sense. Relative inequality comparisons involve
comparing the ratios of income to average income across individuals. Absolute
inequality comparisons involve comparing distances between incomes and mean
income across individuals. As mentioned above, relative inequality comparisons
can be thought of as a limiting case of relative poverty comparisons, namely, when
the relative poverty frontier extends over everyone in the population. Absolute
inequality comparisons can be thought of as a limiting case of absolute poverty
comparisons, when the poverty frontier extends beyond the least deprived individ-
uals in the population and when deprivation is measured by the absolute income
difference with the mean.
To gain a better understanding of how our proposed comparisons work in prac-
tice, we apply them to several simulated distributions and also to two diverse
sources of data and different dimensions of well-being: the 1999 Demographic
and Health Survey from India, where we rely on an important health indicator, the
hemoglobin concentration (g/Dl) of women aged 15-49, and an index of the assets
owned by those women’s households; and from Mexico’s 2008 Evaluacio´n Na-
cional del Logro Acade´mico de Centros Escolares (National Evaluation of Aca-
demic Attainment in High Schools), where the indicators of well-being involve
achievement tests administered to all high school students in Mexico, in addition
to an asset index constructed in a similar manner to the India data. These applica-
tions are of considerable interest since little is known empirically about multidi-
mensional inequality rankings. In order to add further relevance to our empirical
work, we provide the sampling distribution of the estimators that are needed to
make inferences about the true population rankings.
The stochastic dominance tests that we use yield very strong results: if we
can reject the null of non-dominance, we can conclude that one population has
greater inequality for broad classes of inequality measures that include arbitrary
aggregation across dimensions of well-being and across individuals. As a result,
we should expect that it is relatively difficult to reject the null. In fact, for many
of the distributions that we study, both simulated and real, this is the case. Com-
pared to our previous work on multivariate poverty comparisons, we find it sig-
nificantly more difficult to reject the null of non-dominance. One reason for this
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is that poverty can be lower in one population than another either because it has
greater means or because it has lower dispersions in the marginal distributions,
while relative poverty or inequality comparisons can differ only due to greater
dispersions. But an equally important reason, highlighted in our simulations, is
that the covariance between dimensions of well-being assumes an overwhelming
importance as we extend the test domain to the least deprived observations in the
sample. Poverty comparisons do not usually consider these wealthier people (by
the focus axiom), but inequality comparisons must do so. In many cases, it will be
possible to draw robust conclusions for a (relative) poverty comparison, but not
for an inequality comparison, because of the increased role that the covariances
play for such comparisons.
2 Multiple indicators of relative well-being
As with several other papers in the literature, we will for simplicity mostly
focus on the 2-dimensional case. Let x and y then be two indicators of individual
well-being normalized by some norm. These indicators could be, for instance,
income, expenditures, calorie consumption, height, cognitive ability, etc., normal-
ized by what is deemed to be enjoyed by a representative individual in a society.
As we will discuss below, these indicators of normalized well-being can be ob-
tained by taking the distance between non-normalized indicators of well-being χ
and ξ and some norm for each, yielding x and y, respectively.
One alternative to thinking of x and y as two indicators of normalized indi-
vidual well-being is to define a function U(χ, ξ) that aggregates χ and ξ into an
overall measure of individual well-being, and think of the distance between this
and a norm defined in units of overall well-being. This approach is fairly common
in the (limited) literature on multivariate inequality measures — see for instance
Weymark (2004) for a discussion. In essence, it reduces the multivariate problem
to a more familiar univariate one, but at a significant cost: it requires specifying a
particular definition of U(χ, ξ), something that is necessarily arbitrary. By avoid-
ing such “two-step” aggregations, our approach provides more general inequality
comparisons.
Let the distribution of these two indicators χ, ξ in the population be given by
an n × 2 matrix denoted as A, where n is the number of individuals. Let the
domain of admissible distributions be denoted as Ξ. We will represent inequality
indices by PA for inequality in A. For any A,B ∈ Ξ, we will therefore say that
A is more unequal than B according to index P if and only if PA > PB . We also
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need two alternative definitions of inequality indices.
Definition 1 P is a strongly relative inequality index if and only if PA = PAΓ for
all 2 × 2 diagonal matrices Γ with elements γii > 0 (i = 1, 2) for which A and
AΓ are both members of Ξ.
Definition 1 is analogous to the scale invariance axiom in univariate inequality
analysis. Let 1 be a matrix whose entries are all equal to 1.
Definition 2 P is a strongly translatable inequality index if and only if PA =
PA+1Γ for all 2×2 diagonal matrices Γ for which A andA+1Γ are both members
of Ξ.
Definition 2 is also analogous to the translation invariance axiom for the anal-
ysis of univariate inequality. These definitions are in the spirit of those found in
Tsui (1995) — see also Weymark (2004). But unlike the univariate case, they may
not be uniformly acceptable. For instance, we may well feel that, if everyone’s
education level is doubled, the contribution of other indicators (such as health or
income) to overall inequality should be affected. In that case, we might not want
to use strongly relative inequality indices since these indices will remain invariant
to such a change.
The above nevertheless suggests that we can think of at least two types of
normalizations to each indicator of well-being. The first normalization (Definition
1) is of a relative type, obtained by a scaling of the indicator by an arbitrary value,
and the second type of normalization (Definition 2) is absolute and is obtained
by a translation of the indicators by an arbitrary value. The mean is an obvious
candidate for these arbitrary values in the context of inequality comparisons, but
other distribution-dependent statistics (such as the median or the mode) could also
be applied.
To implement these mean-normalization procedures, we can use distances be-
tween indicators of well-being and their population mean (for absolute inequality
comparisons) or the same distances but divided by the mean (for relative inequal-
ity comparisons). For an indicator χ of non-normalized well-being with mean µχ,
let then
xρ = ρ
(
χ− µχ
µχ
)
+ (1− ρ) (χ− µχ) . (1)
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Absolute inequality in χ can be assessed by using x0, and relative inequality by
using x1 (and similarly for another indicator of relative well-being, yρ, defined
by replacing χ by ξ in (1)). The use of x0 and x1 in indices of inequality will
make the indices strongly translatable and strongly relative in x, respectively (and
similarly for y0 and y1 with respect to ξ). Intermediate inequality in χ and ξ can
be assessed by using 0 < ρ < 1. For expositional simplicity, we will however
sometimes omit the indices ρ from xρ and yρ.
We then assume that we wish to compute an aggregate index of inequality
based on the distribution of x and y. Denote by
λ(x, y) : ℜ2 → ℜ
∣∣∣∣∂λ(x, y)∂x ≤ 0,
∂λ(x, y)
∂y
≤ 0 (2)
a summary measure of the degree of relative deprivation of an individual. Note
that the derivative conditions in (2) mean that different indicators can each con-
tribute to decreasing overall deprivation. We make the differentiability assump-
tions for expositional simplicity, but they are not strictly necessary so long as
λ(x, y) is non-decreasing over x and y.
We may wish to focus on those with the greatest degree of deprivation.This
can be done by drawing an inequality frontier separating those with lower and
those with greater relative deprivation. We can think of this frontier as a series of
points at which overall relative deprivation is kept constant at a critical value. This
frontier is assumed to be defined implicitly by a locus of the form λ(x, y) = 0,
and is analogous to the usual downward-sloping indifference curves in the (x, y)
space. As in the poverty literature, (x, y) values that lie beyond this frontier do not
contribute to aggregate relative deprivation. Thus, to obtain an inequality measure
in the usual sense, the frontier would need to be set beyond the most extreme
values of x and y. The set of those over whom we want to aggregate relative
deprivation is then obtained as:
Λ(λ) = {(x, y) |(λ(x, y) ≥ 0} . (3)
Consider Figure 1 with thresholds zx and zy in dimensions of indicators x and
y. The dotted λ1(x, y) line gives an “intersection” frontier: it considers someone
to be relatively deprived only if he is deprived in both of the two dimensions of
x and y, and therefore if he lies within the dashed rectangle of Figure 1. λ2(x, y)
(the L-shaped, dashed line) gives a “union” frontier: it considers someone to be
relatively deprived if he is deprived in either of the two dimensions, and therefore
if he lies below or to the left of the dotted line. Finally, the continuous λ3(x, y)
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line provides an intermediate approach. Someone can be relatively deprived even
if y > zy, if his x value is sufficiently low to lie to the left of λ3(x, y) = 0.
To define multidimensional inequality indices more precisely, let the joint dis-
tribution of x and y be denoted by F (x, y). For analytical simplicity, we focus
on classes of inequality indices that are additive across individuals. An additive
inequality index that combines the two dimensions of well-being can be defined
generally as P (λ),
P (λ) =
∫ ∫
Λ(λ)
pi(x, y;λ) dF (x, y), (4)
where pi(x, y;λ) is the contribution to inequality of an individual with relative
well-being indicators x and y. By the definition of the inequality frontier, we have
that
pi(x, y;λ)
{
≥ 0 if λ(x, y) ≥ 0
= 0 otherwise. (5)
The pi function in equation (5) is thus the weight that the inequality measure
attaches to someone who is inside the inequality frontier. That weight could be 1
(for a count of how many are relatively deprived), but it could take on many other
values as well, depending on the inequality measure of interest.
A bi-dimensional dominance surface can now be defined as:
Dαx,αy(zx, zy) =
∫ zy
0
∫ zx
0
(zx − x)
αx(zy − y)
αy dF (x, y) (6)
for integers αx ≥ 0 and αy ≥ 0. This dominance surface aggregates products of
distances between indicators x and y and thresholds zx and zy — these distances
are usually referred to as poverty gaps in the poverty literature. We can also rewrite
(6) as
Dαx,αy(zx, zy) =
∫ zx
0
(zx − x)
αx
[∫ zy
0
(zy − y)
αy dF (y|x)
]
dF (x), (7)
where F (x) is the univariate (or marginal) distribution function of x and F (y|x)
is the distribution of y conditional on x. This says that the bivariate dominance
curve can be thought of as the integral of the univariate dominance curves for y,
conditional on x, weighted by the gaps in x,
∫ zx
0
(zx − x)
αxdF (x).
We generate the dominance surface by varying the values of zx and zy over
an appropriately chosen domain, with the height of the surface given by equa-
tion (6). In particular, if the domain of the integration is the entire (x, y) plane,
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then Dαx,αy(zx, zy) qualifies as a usual measure of inequality. D0,0(zx, zy) =
F (zx, zy) generates a bivariate cumulative density function of relative well-
being. Note also that (6) is a two-dimensional generalization of the FGT index
(Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984) defined over gaps of relative well-being.
An important feature of the dominance surface is that it is influenced by the
covariance between x and y, the two indicators of normalized well-being, because
the integrand is multiplicative. Rewriting (6), we find indeed that
Dαx,αy(zx, zy) =
∫ zy
0
(zx − x)
αx dF (x)
∫ zx
0
(zy − y)
αy dF (y)
+ cov ((zx − x)
αx , (zy − y)
αy) . (8)
The height of the dominance surface is therefore the product of the two unidi-
mensional curves plus the covariance in the poverty gaps in the two dimensions.
Thus, the higher the correlation between x and y, the higher the dominance sur-
faces, other things being equal.
Equation (8) highlights the critical importance of the covariance between di-
mensions of relative well-being in the two populations. For first- and second-order
comparisons (αx = 0, 1;αy == 0, 1), the integrals in the first term on the right-
hand side are equal for all distributions when the values of zx and zy are beyond
the highest values of x and y in the populations. In this region, the dominance sur-
faces can differ only if the covariances between the poverty gaps in each dimen-
sion differ across the populations. This is true even if the univariate distributions
are significantly more unequal in one population.
3 Dominance conditions
Our inequality comparisons make use of orders of dominance, sx and sy in the
x and in the y dimensions, which will correspond respectively to sx = αx+1 and
sy = αy + 1. The parameters αx and αy also capture the aversion to inequality in
the x and in the y dimensions, respectively.
To describe the class of inequality measures for which the dominance surfaces
defined in equation (6) are sufficient to establish multidimensional inequality or-
derings, assume first that pi in (4) is left differentiable1 with respect to x and y
over the set Λ(λ). Denote by pix the first derivative2 of pi(x, y;λ) with respect to
1This differentiability assumption is made for expositional simplicity. It could be relaxed.
2The derivatives include the implicit effects of x and y on λ(x, y).
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x; by piy the first derivative of pi(x, y;λ) with respect to y; by pixy the derivative of
pi(x, y;λ) with respect to both x and y; and treat similar expressions accordingly.
Let λ+ be an uppermost inequality frontier, i.e., a frontier that encompasses
all of those individuals whose normalized well-being could eventually enter into
P (λ). We can then define the following two classes of bidimensional relative
poverty indices:
Π1,1(λ+) =


P (λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Λ(λ) ⊂ Λ(λ+);
pi(x, y;λ) = 0, whenever λ(x, y) ≥ 0;
pix(x, y;λ) ≤ 0 and piy(x, y;λ) ≤ 0 ∀x, y;
pixy(x, y;λ) ≥ 0, ∀x, y;


(9)
and
Π2,2(λ+) =


P (λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P (λ) ∈ Π1,1(λ+);
pix(x, y;λ) = 0, piy(x, y;λ) = 0, pixx(x, y;λ) = 0,
piyy(x, y;λ) = 0, and pixy(x, y;λ) = 0 when λ(x, y) = 0;
pixyy(x, y;λ) ≤ 0 and pixxy(x, y;λ) ≤ 0, ∀x, y;
and pixxyy(x, y;λ) ≥ 0, ∀x, y.


(10)
The conditions for membership in Π1,1(λ) require that the inequality indices
be decreasing in both x and y. They also demand that this decrease be stronger
the lower the level of the other dimension of relative well-being: pixy(x, y;λ) ≥ 0.
This is equivalent to an assumption of “substitutability” between the dimensions
of well-being. We return below to the interpretation and the role of this assump-
tion.
Note that pixx(x, y;λ) ≥ 0 ∀x, y and piyy(x, y;λ) ≥ 0 ∀x, y are conditions
that are implied by the continuity conditions pixx = 0 and piyy = 0 at the frontier
and by the conditions pixyy(x, y;λ) ≤ 0 and pixyy(x, y;λ) ≤ 0. The conditions
for membership in Π2,2(λ) thus require that the inequality indices be convex in
both x and y, and that they therefore obey the principle of transfers in both of
these dimensions. This assumption seems more natural in an inequality context
than in a welfare/absolute poverty context. It would indeed seem to make sense
that overall multidimensional equality be monotonically increasing in the equality
of either dimension, everything else being the same. The conditions for Π2,2(λ)
also require that the transfer principle be more important in one dimension of
relative well-being the lower the level of the other dimension of relative well-
being. Finally, they also impose that the second-order derivative in one dimension
of well-being be convex in the level of the other indicator of well-being. This is
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equivalent to saying that the concern for inequality in one dimension is convex in
the level of the other indicator. This is a regularity condition that demands that
equalizing transfers in the x dimension become progressively less important as
the value of y is increased.3 We also return to this below.
To see how this differs from another popular definition of convexity, we can
introduce the following definition.
Definition 3 (Bistochastic majorization as a multi-attribute version of the Pigou-
Dalton transfer, Weymark 2004) For all A,B ∈ Ξ for which A 6= B , A is more
unequal than B if B = ΣA for some n × n bistochastic matrix Σ that is not a
permutation matrix.
As Savaglio (2006) writes, this definition “(...) is a sort of decomposability
property, which allows [orderings] to be coherent with an inequality measurement
via an additive evaluation function” (p.90) — see also Dardanoni (1995). Figure
2 illustrates, however, how a bi-stochastic transformation can increase inequality
in well-being as measured by a utility function U . Assume that an initial distribu-
tion A of well-being is made of points a and d. Assume also that a bi-stochastic
transformation moves point a to point b and point d to point c in order to gener-
ate a new distribution B of well-being made of points b and c. The bistochastic
transformation moves point a and d closer to the center (given by x and y) in both
dimensions at the same time and at the same rate.
Overall well-being (or utility U(x, y)) was the same at U0 for each point a
and d in A initially; now it is lower for individual b (at U1) than for individual
c (larger than U1). Reducing inequality simultaneously and equi-proportionately
in each dimension at the same time thus increases inequality in the U dimension.
This therefore suggests that a bi-stochastic transformation of A into B might lead
to greater inequality in B.
The conditions for membership in Π2,2(λ) fortunately do not impose the bis-
tochastic majorization condition. They only imply that inequality should fall if, as
in Figure 3, points {a, c} were moved (simultaneously and at the same speed)
towards point b, or if points {a, g} were moved towards point d, or if points
{c, i} were moved towards point f . These properties follow from the signs of the
3The classes Π1,1 and Π2,2 are reminiscent of the classes of welfare functions used by
Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982). Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) nevertheless allow for pos-
sibly different signs for pixy(x, y) and pixxyy(x, y) since they also consider the case of functions
that show “complementarity” in indicators. They do not, however, allow for Λ(λ+) to exclude
anyone.
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second-order derivatives, pixx(x, y;λ) ≥ 0 and piyy(x, y;λ) ≥ 0 ∀x, y. The con-
ditions for membership in Π2,2(λ) do not, however, require that inequality should
fall if points {a, i} were moved closer together towards point e — this would be
implied, however, by the bistochastic majorization principle.
The sign of the third-order derivatives, pixyy(x, y;λ) ≤ 0 ∀x, y, also imply that
the fall in inequality (as measured by members of the Π2,2(λ)) will be larger if
points {a, g} are moved towards point d than if points {c, i} are moved towards
point f . Similarly, the conditions for membership in Π2,2(λ) also require that
the fall in inequality will be larger if points {g, i} are moved towards point h
than if points {a, c} are moved towards point b. Furthermore, the condition that
pixxyy(x, y;λ) ≥ 0, ∀x, y implies that replacing in Figure 3 points {g, i} and {e, e}
by points {h, h} and {d, f}, respectively, will reduce inequality by more than if
points {d, f} and {b, b} are replaced by points {e, e} and {a, c}.
The inequality impact of the correlation between attributes, as captured by
the pixy(x, y;λ) ≥ 0 condition, is also important. We can illustrate this in three
different ways:
1. First, if we were to replace points {c, g} by points {a, i} on Figure 3, then
bivariate inequality would need to fall, though univariate inequality would
remain unchanged.
2. Second, a movement from points {a, i} to points {d, f}would decrease uni-
variate inequality in the y dimension and would leave univariate inequality
in the x dimension unchanged. A movement from points {a, i} to points
{d, f} would, however, not necessarily decrease bivariate inequality since
such a movement would increase the correlation between the attributes.
3. Third, moving point i beyond f towards c, and moving point a beyond d
towards g, will eventually increase bivariate inequality, since {c, g} is less
equal than {a, i}. This is despite the fact that univariate inequality in both
of the x and y dimensions never increases (and sometimes falls) in that
movement.
Note that this substitutability assumption is probably more defendable in a mul-
tidimensional inequality context than in a multidimensional poverty context. It
would seem indeed that replacing points {c, g} by points {a, i} on Figure 3 should
almost certainly reduce relative welfare disparities between the individuals, al-
though there might be situations in which that change might increase absolute
poverty — see for instance the discussion in Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006).
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Let then ∆P (λ) = PA(λ) − PB(λ) and ∆Dsx−1,sy−1(zx, zy) =
D
sx−1,sy−1
A (zx, zy) − D
sx−1,sy−1
B (zx, zy). This leads to the following dominance
relationships for sx = sy = 1, 2:
Theorem 1 (Πsx,sy relative poverty dominance)
∆P (λ) > 0, ∀P (λ) ∈ Πsx,sy(λ+)
iff ∆Dsx−1,sy−1(zx, zy) > 0, ∀(zx, zy) ∈ Λ(λ+). (11)
Proof: See appendix.
Theorem 1 says that it is possible to order relative poverty across distributions
A and B by checking whether condition (11) holds. If condition (11) holds, then
relative poverty is larger in A than in B for all of the relative poverty indices that
belong to the class Πsx,sy(λ+), sx = sy = 1, 2.
Several remarks follow from Theorem 1.
Remark 1 Inequality dominance (that is, dominance over the entire ranges of
possible values for x and y) is obtained by letting λ+ lie beyond the largest values
of x and y. Then (11) implies that inequality is larger in A than in B.
Remark 2 Πsx,xy dominance does not imply univariate dominance in either of
the two indicators.
Remark 3 For bivariate Π2,2 inequality dominance, we need ∆cov (x, y) > 0,
that is, that the covariance of the indicators be greater in A than in B.
Remark 4 An array of tests of absolute and relative inequality dominance in each
dimension can be made with Theorem 1 by using xρ and yρ with different values for
ρ. For instance, using x0 and y0 leads to a test of absolute inequality dominance in
each dimension; using x0 and y1 leads to a test of absolute inequality dominance
in the x and of relative inequality dominance in the y dimension; and so on.
Remark 5 Because of the normalizations used to obtain xρ and yρ (see (1)), Π1,1
relative poverty dominance is only feasible over a range of xρ and yρ that does not
extend to the largest value of these variables. Since ∫ zdFxρ(z) = ∫ zdFyρ(z) = 0
for all values of ρ, it is indeed not possible to find ∆D0,0(zx, zy) > 0 for all values
of (zx, zy). Hence, Π1,1 inequality dominance is not possible.
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Remark 6 If the pi(x, y;λ) relative deprivation function in (4) were separable in
x and y, the cross-derivatives involved in the definition of the Πsx,sy(λ+) classes
would all be zero. That would inter alia imply that the impact on pi of changing x
would need to be independent of the value of y and would need to depend (poten-
tially) only on the value of x. Such separability is implicit when one is checking
for multivariate inequality dominance by performing univariate comparisons in-
dependently for each dimension of well-being.
Such a separability assumption has undesirable consequences in the context of
multivariate inequality measurement. Consider an example involving a transfer of
an indicator of cognitive ability (i.e., achievement tests) (the variable x) between
Bill Gates and John School, and assume as above that pixx(x, y;λ) ≥ 0. Also
assume that despite his vastly superior income (variable y), Bill Gates happens to
score lower on achievement tests than John School. Separability of the pi(x, y;λ)
in x and y would imply that a transfer of ability from John School to Bill Gates
would necessarily reduce overall inequality. This would seem undesirable since
that transfer would also increase the welfare distance between the two individuals.
4 Estimation and inference
We now consider the estimation of the surfaces derived above as well as sta-
tistical inference on them. This can be seen as a generalization of the procedures
followed in Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006) to the case of surfaces, curves and
indices whose thresholds and individual functions of contributions to total poverty
are subject to sampling variability because they depend on unknown characteris-
tics and moments of the distribution (e.g., the means µχ and µξ of the variables).
To start with, note that the Dsx−1,sy−1(zx, zy) functions defined in (6) above
can be seen as a special case of the more general class of bidimensional surfaces
defined as
D =
∫ gχ(µχ)
0
∫ gξ(µξ)
0
h(χ, ξ;µχ, µξ)dF (χ, ξ), (12)
where gχ, gξ and h are continuous and differentiable functions of µχ and µξ. A
natural estimator of D is obtained by replacing F by its empirical counterpart,
Fˆ , and the µχ and µξ by their sampling values. To see this better, suppose that
we have a random sample of N independently and identically distributed (IID)
observations drawn from the joint distribution of χ and ξ. We can write these
observations of χL and ξL, drawn from a population L = A,B, as (χLi , ξLi ),
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i = 1, . . . , N . Let I(·) be the indicator function, which is equal to 1 if its argument
is true and 0 otherwise. This gives:
DˆL =
∫ gχ(µˆLχ )
0
∫ gξ(µˆLξ )
0 h(χ, ξ; µˆ
L
χ, µˆ
L
ξ )dFˆ
L(χ, ξ)
= N−1
∑N
i=1 I(χ
L
i ≤ gχ(µˆ
L
χ)I(ξ
L
i ≤ gξ(µˆ
L
ξ )h(χ
L
i , y
L
i ; µˆ
L
χ , µˆ
L
ξ ).
(13)
Denoting f+ = max(f, 0), the dominance surfaces defined in (6) are obtained
from (13) by setting
gχ(µχ) = zxµχ
gξ(µξ) = zyµξ
h(χ, ξ;µχ, µξ) =
(
zx −
χ
µχ
)αx
+
(
zy −
ξ
µξ
)αy
+
(14)
for relative inequality both in χ and in ξ; by setting
gχ(µχ) = zx + µχ
gξ(µξ) = zyµξ
h(χ, ξ;µχ, µξ) = (zx − (ξ − µχ))
αx
+
(
zy −
ξ
µξ
)αy
+
(15)
for absolute inequality in χ and relative inequality in ξ; and by setting
gχ(µχ) = zx + µχ
gξ(µχ) = zy + µξ
h(χ, ξ;µχ, µξ) = (zx − (χ− µχ))
αx
+ (zy − (ξ − µξ))
αy
+
(16)
for absolute inequality both in χ and in ξ. Substituting the above into (13) gives es-
timators of the various combinations of absolute and relative dominance surfaces
discussed above. For arbitrary αx and αy, (13) then has the convenient property
of being a simple sum of IID variables, even if we allow for the fact that χ and ξ
will generally be correlated across observations.
The following theorem provides the asymptotic sampling distribution of the
general case given by (13) under relatively minor conditions and in the case in
which we have a sample from each of two populations, A and B, that may or may
not have been drawn independently from each other.
Theorem 2 Let the joint population moments of order 2 of χA + ξA +
h(χA, ξA;µAχ , µ
A
ξ ) and χB + ξB + h(χB, ξB;µBχ , µBξ ) be finite. Then
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N1/2
(
DˆA −DA
)
and N1/2
(
DˆB −DB
)
are asymptotically normal with mean
zero, with asymptotic covariance structure given by (L,M = A,B)
limN→∞Ncov
(
DˆL, DˆM
)
= E
[(
mLχχ
L +mLξ ξ
L + I(χL ≤ gχ(µ
L
χ))I(ξ
L ≤ gξ(µ
L
ξ ))h(χ
L, ξL;µLχ , µ
L
ξ )
)
·
(
mMχ χ
M +mMξ ξ
M + I(χM ≤ gχ(µ
M
χ ))I(ξ
M ≤ gξ(µ
M
ξ ))h(χ
M , ξM ;µMχ , µ
M
ξ )
)]
−E
[
mLχχ
L +mLξ ξ
L + I(χL ≤ gχ(µ
L
χ))I(ξ
L ≤ gξ(µ
L
ξ ))h(χ
L, ξL;µLχ , µ
L
ξ )
]
·E
[
mLχχ
L +mLξ ξ
L + I(χL ≤ gχ(µ
L
χ))I(ξ
L ≤ gξ(µ
L
ξ ))h(χ
L, ξL;µLχ, µ
L
ξ )
]
(17)
where
mLχ = g
′
χ(µ
L
χ)
∫ gξ(µLξ )
0 h(gχ(µ
L
χ), ξ;µ
L
χ, µ
L
ξ )f(gχ(µ
L
χ), ξ)dξ
+
∫ gχ(µLχ )
0
∫ gξ(µLξ )
0 h
µχ(χ, ξ;µLχ, µ
L
ξ )dF
L(χ, ξ)
(18)
and
mLξ = g
′
ξ(µ
L
ξ )
∫ gχ(µLχ )
0
h(χ, gξ(µ
L
ξ );µ
L
χ, µ
L
ξ )f(χ, gξ(µ
L
ξ ))dχ
+
∫ gχ(µLχ )
0
∫ gξ(µLξ )
0 h
µξ(χ, ξ;µLχ, µ
L
ξ )dF
L(χ, ξ),
(19)
and where f(χ, ξ) is the joint density of χ and ξ.
Proof: See the Appendix (Section 8).
When the samples from the populations A and B are independent, the variance of
each of DˆA and DˆB can be found by using (17) and by replacing N by NA and
NB respectively. The covariance between the two estimators is then zero. The
elements of the asymptotic covariance matrix in (17) can be estimated consistently
using their sample equivalents. Further details are provided in the Appendix of
Section 8.
5 Simulation exercises
To provide a better understanding of how our proposed multivariate inequality
comparisons are likely to work in practice, we undertake simulations that com-
pare a variety of dist ributions. In all cases, we create two populations of 200,000
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individuals and joint distributions of x and y that are bivariate normal. We always
shift these distributions so that they include no negative values, so the means of the
marginal distributions are usually around 5 or 6. We then sample from those pop-
ulations and compare the samples. In most cases, we use a sample size of 1000,
which is roughly the size of large sub-samples (by region, say) in common house-
hold surveys like the Living Standards Measurement Surveys or the Demographic
and Health Surveys. All the results reported here are for 100 such samples.
The phrase “non-statistical results” refers to comparisons made from simply
comparing the surface estimates of Dsx−1,sy−1(zx, zy) without carrying out any
formal statistical testing. The phrase“statistical results” refers to statistical in-
ference results. In testing for inequality dominance, we follow the intersection-
union approach proposed by Kaur, Prakasa Rao, and Singh (1994) and recently
extended by Davidson and Duclos (2006). We posit a null hypothesis of non-
dominance of A by B and an alternative hypothesis of dominance of A by B. We
reject the null and accept the alternative that B has less inequality than A if and
only if the t statistics at all of the test points exceed the usual 5% critical value of
the normal distribution.
Since the theory we present above stresses the importance of the covariance
between dimensions of well-being, our first simulations vary the correlation be-
tween x and y in the first population, while keeping it at zero for the second. In all
cases, the variance of the marginal distributions is one. Table 1 gives the results.
For a sample size of 1000 and a difference in correlation of 0.2, which is plausi-
ble for several of the actual distributions that we will examine in Section 6, there
are no statistically significant comparisons between the two samples, even though
about half of the non-statistical comparisons find that the dominance surface esti-
mates for sample 1 are above those for sample 2 everywhere. Even for very large
differences in correlations of 0.6, there are relatively few statistically significant
differences between the dominance surfaces, even though virtually all of the non-
statistical comparisons would appear conclusive. The results are similar across
absolute and relative comparisons.
Table 2 shows the number of rejections at each point in the (x, y) domain
where we test for differences in the surfaces. The origin is at the lower left, and
the first column and last row give the coordinates for x and y. This particular
result is for relative inequality comparisons when population 1 has a correlation
of 0.6 and population 2 has no correlation between x and y. It is clear that the
reason that we cannot reject the null often is that there are relatively few rejections
in the areas of the surface where x is relatively large and y is relatively small,
or vice-versa. This is clearly a problem of statistical power: there are too few
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observations in these regions of the surfaces to infer dominance with sufficient
confidence. Unfortunately, even when we increase the sample sizes to 10,000, we
get relatively few significant differences. (See the last two columns of Table 1.)
Thus, for the typical samples from national household surveys that are conducted
in developing countries, it may be difficult to reject the null for samples that differ
only in their correlation between dimensions of well-being. Nevertheless, it will
often be possible to find differences in relative poverty for poverty measures that
do not extend to the upper left and lower right corners of the dominance surfaces.
This would include a wide range of intersection relative poverty measures, but no
union measures.
Table 3 gives results for comparisons when the standard deviations of the
marginal distributions in population 2 are a multiple of those in distribution 1
for both x and y. As equation (8) shows, these surfaces cannot differ over the en-
tire (x, y) domain because they have the same covariance of zero. Thus, we report
statistical differences for all test points except the extreme one at the upper right
of the test domain that is just beyond the maximum value of x and y. These are,
then, relative poverty comparisons, valid for a very wide range of relative poverty
lines and both union and intersection poverty measures. Once the ratio of standard
deviations reaches 1.4, well within the range that we find in real samples in the
following section, we begin to have a significant number of cases in which the
dominance surfaces differ statistically. Thus, for samples with strong univariate
differences in inequality, we should also find bivariate differences, except at the
extreme of the distribution where only the correlation matters.
Table 4, however, shows that a relatively modest correlation in one population
can offset even rather large differences in univariate dispersions, and vice-versa.
In the first two columns we compare population 2 with univariate standard devia-
tions that are 1.6 times as large as those for population 1. In the first column, there
is no correlation in either population and, excluding the extreme test point of the
test domain, there are many significant differences between the dominance sur-
faces. In column 2, population 1 now has correlation between x and y of 0.2. This
greatly reduces the number of significant differences between dominance surfaces
drawn from these two populations. In such cases, one-at-time univariate compar-
isons will reject the null of equality between the two samples too easily because
they do not consider the correlation between dimensions.
Column 3 shows that there are some (though relatively few) significant differ-
ences between samples if the correlation between x and y in population 1 is 0.6
higher than that in population 2. However, all of these significant differences van-
ish if we increase the standard deviations in the second sample by even a modest
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20 percent. Overall, in cases where one population has greater correlation while
the other has greater univariate variances, it could be uncommon to conclude that
there is a statistically significant difference in multidimensional inequality, be-
cause of the conflicting effects of univariate inequality and joint inequality.
Thus far, our multivariate inequality comparisons are more likely not to reject
the null of non-dominance than one-at-a-time univariate comparisons, but it is
also possible that a correlation between x and y helps to resolve contradictory
univariate results. In particular, it is possible that one univariate test rejects the
null while another does not, but the bivariate test does reject the null of non-
dominance. It is also possible that one univariate test shows significantly less
inequality in distribution A while the other shows less in distribution B, and the
bivariate test still shows greater inequality in one or the other distribution, if it has
a large covariance between x and y.
Table 5 gives results for some such cases. In the first column, population 2
has a somewhat smaller standard deviation of x and a larger standard deviation
of y than population 1. In this case, even a large correlation between x and y
in population 1 is insufficient to produce statistically significant differences in
the bivariate comparisons. However, if the variances of y are the same in both
populations, the larger correlation in the first population is now sufficient to reject
the null about half of the time.
6 Examples
We turn now to examples using real data. We focus on the interesting cases
in which the bivariate tests that we propose produce different results than one-
at-a-time univariate comparisons for the same dimensions of well-being. Ta-
ble 6 gives results from the 1999 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for
India. It considers relative poverty and inequality in two dimensions of well-
being: the hemoglobin concentration (g/Dl) of women aged 15-49, and an index
of the assets owned by those women’s households. Hemoglobin is an impor-
tant health indicator. Low hemoglobin concentrations cause a variety of health
problems and have been shown to reduce physical productivity — see for in-
stance Haas and Brownlie (2001) and Horton and Ross (2003). Household assets
are a good proxy for a household’s material well-being (Sahn and Stifel 2000 and
Sahn and Stifel 2003). The index is constructed as the first factor from a fac-
tor analysis of the household’s water source, type of toilet facility, the household
head’s years of schooling, and indicators of whether or not the household has elec-
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tricity, a radio, a television, a refrigerator, and a bicycle. Since this distribution is
centered around zero, it is shifted rightward so that it has no negative values.
The comparisons in Table 6 are between the Indian states of Goa and Ra-
jasthan. Note that Goa has lower Gini coefficients for both assets and hemoglobin
concentrations, but also has a significantly higher correlation between those two
variables. The bottom section of the table shows that Goa dominates Rajasthan
in both dimensions of well-being independently: across the entire distribution of
assets or hemoglobin, Goa’s dominance curve is below Rajasthan’s, and these
differences are statistically significant. Based on this information, one would con-
clude that Goa has less inequality than Rajasthan.
However, the bivariate comparison (11) cannot reject the null that Goa has
more inequality than Rajasthan. Table 7 shows the t-statistics for the null hypothe-
sis that the two states’ dominance surfaces are equal at each of 100 equally spaced
points across the entire domain of the joint distribution of assets and hemoglobin
concentrations. These differences change sign, indicating that the dominance sur-
faces cross, and the differences are rarely statistically significant; when they are
statistically significant, they also sometimes indicate that Goa has more relative
poverty. Thus, the higher correlation between assets and hemoglobin in Goa is
sufficient to nullify the conclusion drawn from the univariate comparisons.
On the other hand, it is also possible that the univariate comparisons are in-
conclusive or contradictory (showing that A dominates B in one dimension while
the opposite is true in the other), yet the bivariate comparison rejects the null
of non-dominance. Tables 8 and 9 show similar comparisons for Goa and the
state of Himachal Pradesh. In this case, Himachal Pradesh has lower asset in-
equality, but we cannot reject the null that Goa has less inequality of hemoglobin
concentrations. The bivariate comparison, however, clearly rejects the null of non-
dominance across the entire domain of the dominance surfaces, so we reject the
null in favor of greater bivariate inequality in Goa.4
To have a sense of how common these results are, Table 10 summarizes uni-
variate and bivariate comparisons across all possible combinations of states in
the 1999 India DHS. The first frame is for relative inequality comparisons, for
which the data are divided by their mean. The second frame is for absolute in-
equality comparisons (the mean is subtracted from all data). The third frame is
for non-normalized data; these comparisons are the same as the poverty compar-
4This example is also a caution that simple recourse to the Ginis and correlation coefficients
can be misleading. What matters is the dispersion for each variable and the dependence between
them over the entire distribution.
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isons developed earlier in Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006), but with the poverty
frontier extended beyond all of observations in the sample. Thus, they are welfare
comparisons.
A striking result in Table 10 is how few cases of bivariate inequality dom-
inance there are: only 33 for relative inequality and 16 for absolute inequality
(out of 325 possible comparisons across Indian states) at dominance order (2,2),
and somewhat more for order (3,3), especially for the absolute inequality case (70
out of 325). This compares to 125 cases of bivariate dominance for the welfare
comparisons at order (2,2).
Closer examination of the table shows that there are two reasons for this. First,
the last two columns show non-statistical comparisons. That is, if one sample sur-
face is everywhere below another, we conclude that it dominates, regardless of the
statistical significance of that difference. This yields welfare dominance in 197
cases, relative inequality dominance in 129, and absolute inequality dominance
in 90. This is to be expected insofar as the non-normalized welfare distributions
can differ either because the means differ or the dispersions differ. Because the
inequality comparisons normalize the data, they can differ only if the dispersions
around the mean differ. Previous work on incomes (Datt and Ravallion (1992))
and anthropometry (Sahn and Younger (2005)) has shown that distributional dif-
ferences are often dominated by different means rather than dispersions. So it is
not surprising to find fewer differences when examining normalized distributions.
Table 10 also shows that differences in dominance surfaces are less likely to
be statistically significant for the inequality comparisons. For relative inequality,
only 33 of the 129 cases where the surfaces do not cross are statistically signifi-
cant, compared to 125 of 197 for the welfare comparisons. This is despite the fact
that our samples are relatively large – averaging about 1100 women per state (but
with some as low as 280).
A second observation about Table 10 is that the interesting cases — those for
which the bivariate and the “one-at-a-time” univariate comparisons come to dif-
ferent conclusions — are relatively rare. For the inequality comparisons, there are
no statistically significant cases of bivariate dominance when both of the univari-
ate dominance tests are insignificant.5 (See the first row of each block.) When
the univariate comparisons both reject the null and are in agreement — the second
row in each block — the bivariate case is statistically insignificant a little more
5The fact that there is only one such case for welfare suggests that these results
may depend on the variables that we have chosen. In our prior work on poverty
(Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006a)), we found many more such cases when studying household
expenditures per capita and children’s height-for-age.
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than half the time, and the bivariate surfaces actually cross fairly often. (See the
last two columns.) This is far more common than with the welfare comparisons.
Finally, when the univariate results are inconsistent, either because population A
dominates population B in one dimension while the reverse is true in the other, or
because one difference is statistically significant while the other is not, it is rela-
tively rare that the bivariate comparison can resolve this conflict. (See the third
row of each block.) The welfare comparisons are able to do this significantly more
often.
Our second example is more encouraging. The data come from the 2008 Eval-
uacio´n Nacional del Logro Acade´mico de Centros Escolares (National Evaluation
of Academic Attainment in High Schools), a test given to all high school students
in Mexico. In addition, a sample of students’ households included information
on asset holdings, with which we have constructed an asset index. The index is
based on a factor analysis of the assets, and we have exponentiated the result to
ensure that all values are positive. Because the test scores were standardized, we
use instead each student’s national percentile rank in the distribution of scores.
Results of comparisons across Mexican states are summarized in Table 11, in a
manner analogous to Table 10.
In these comparisons, we reject the null of non-dominance for the relative in-
equality comparisons in about one-third of the cases, though rejections for the
absolute case remain relatively rare, as in the India DHS data. The larger than
normal sample sizes (about 6700 observations per state, on average) appear to
help since statistical and non-statistical results are more closely in line, especially
for relative inequality and for welfare comparisons. The share (about one third) of
rejections is now substantially closer to the share for welfare comparisons (about
half) in this case than it was in any of the India DHS comparisons. It is also notable
that the bivariate comparisons are able to resolve inconsistent univariate compar-
isons in a non-trivial number of cases for relative (28/255), absolute (26/253), and
welfare (37/244) comparisons, unlike the India data, where such cases were rare
for the inequality comparisons. Furthermore, it is quite rare for the second-order
bivariate comparisons for relative inequality (17/144) and welfare (4/200) to re-
verse the univariate comparisons when they are consistent and reject the null of
non-dominance. The bivariate comparisons are more demanding, so we would
expect them to reject less often than the one-at-a-time univariate comparisons. In
this Mexican illustration, therefore, making use of the entire bivariate distributions
does not seem significantly to prevent making robust comparisons of inequality
across distributions.
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7 Conclusion
The paper has considered multivariate relative poverty and inequality compar-
isons. We do so in the spirit of Sen’s “partial orderings” and follow the stochastic
dominance approach to distributional comparisons. The approach also draws on
our previous work addressing multidimensional absolute poverty comparisons.
Here, we use similar methods, but first normalize the data, either relatively (di-
viding by the mean) or absolutely (shifting the mean to zero). We call poverty
comparisons on such normalized variables “relative poverty” comparisons; ex-
tending the relevant poverty frontier to the limits of the joint enables making in-
equality comparisons. As in the stochastic dominance literature, the comparisons
are made robust to the choice of any particular poverty or inequality index that is
a member of some class. An important feature of our approach is that it is also
robust to aggregation procedures across dimensions of well-being. We also de-
rive the sampling distribution of our estimators, thus allowing our distributional
comparisons to be robust to sampling variability.
Based on simulated distributions as well as asset and health variables from the
1999 DHS in India and mathematics and Spanish test scores and assets from the
2008 ENLACE in Mexico, we gain some practical experience and insights into
the methods we propose. Our empirical applications suggests that finding bivari-
ate inequality differences may be difficult with some variables and typical survey
data sample sizes. In particular, bivariate inequality comparisons using assets and
health variables in India do not reject the null of non-dominance nearly as often
as welfare comparisons do for these variables. Further, it is rare for the bivariate
comparisons to reject the null of non-dominance when the univariate comparisons
do not. Comparisons using mathematics test scores and assets in Mexico are more
revealing, as there are more rejections of the null, and more cases in which these
bivariate comparisons “resolve” inconsistent univariate comparisons in each di-
mension alone. It is likely that results with other variables and distributions will
differ, especially if we consider incomes or expenditures as one of the dimensions
of well-being. That is certainly an interesting avenue for future research.
22
Table 1: Results for simulating different correlations
Correlation in sample 1 0.2 0.6 0.2
Sample size 1000 1000 10,000
Statistical Non-Statistical Statistical Non-Statistical Statistical Non-Statistical
Share of relative dominance results 0.00 0.48 0.24 0.94 0.17 0.93
Share of absolute dominance results 0.00 0.45 0.17 0.94 0.20 0.96
Notes: Statistical tests at 95% confidence level
Shares are out of 100 comparisons
Both distributions are normal with mean=5 and variance=1
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Table 2: Number of rejections (out of 100) per test point, relative inequality comparisons
1.58 48 71 83 95 99 100 100 100 100 100
1.26 91 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1.17 96 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1.10 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1.05 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99
1.00 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99
0.95 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97
0.90 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 89
0.84 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 98 69
0.73 93 97 98 98 98 98 98 96 92 40
0.00 0.75 0.84 0.90 0.96 1.01 1.05 1.10 1.16 1.25 1.59
Notes: See notes to previous table. Correlation between x and y in sample 1 is 0.6. The first column and last
row are the coordinates in the (x, y) plane where comparisons are made. x and y values are normalized by their
respective means.
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Table 3: Results for simulating different variances
Ratio of standard deviations, 1.2 1.4 1.6
sample 2/sample 1
Sample size 1000 1000 1000
Statistical Non-Statistical Statistical Non-Statistical Statistical Non-Statistical
Share of relative dominance results 0.01 0.92 0.47 1.00 0.87 1.00
Share of absolute dominance results 0.01 0.91 0.44 1.00 0.87 1.00
Notes: Statistical tests at 95% confidence level. Tests exclude the last test point at the extreme of the distribution.
Shares are out of 100 comparisons. Both distributions are normal with mean=5 and no covariance. Variance in
sample 1 is 1.
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Table 4: Results for simulating different variances
Ratio of standard deviations, sample 2/sample 1 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.2
Correlation in sample 1 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.6
Share of relative dominance results 0.87 0.28 0.24 0.00
Share of absolute dominance results 0.87 0.30 0.17 0.00
Notes: Statistical tests at 95% confidence level. Tests exclude the last test point at the extreme of the distribution.
Shares are out of 100 comparisons. Sample size is 1000. Both distributions are normal with mean=5. Variance in
distribution 1 is 1.
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Table 5: Results for simulating different variances for x and y
Ratio of standard deviation for (x, y) (0.8, 1.2) (0.8, 1.0)
distribution 2 / distribution 1
Correlation in distribution 1 0.6 0.6
Share of relative dominance results 0.00 0.47
Share of absolute dominance results 0.00 0.45
Notes: Statistical tests at 95% confidence level. Tests exclude the last test point at
the extreme of the distribution. Shares are out of 100 comparisons. Sample size is
1000. Both distributions are normal with mean=5. Variance in distribution 1 is 1.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Relative Inequality Dominance
Comparisons for Household Assets and Women’s Hemoglobin Concentrations,
Goa and Rajasthan
Goa Rajasthan
Gini coefficients
Assets 0.292 0.452
Hemoglobin 0.076 0.089
Correlation 0.176 0.047
Difference Between Dominance Curves
t-statistics for difference
Sample decile Assets Hemoglobin
0.1 -20.51 -1.88
0.2 -25.36 -3.36
0.3 -25.10 -4.50
0.4 -26.05 -5.43
0.5 -26.53 -6.46
0.6 -27.03 -7.10
0.7 -30.49 -7.39
0.8 -42.83 -7.43
0.9 -15.31 -7.04
Source: 1999 DHS for India.
Notes:
The t-statistic tests the difference of Goa - Rajasthan, so a negative value indicates that Goa has
less relative poverty than Rajasthan.
Poverty lines are set and differences are tested at normalized values of assets and hemoglobin
found at each decile of the combined samples.
Normalization is relative, i.e., data are divided by their means. Dominance order is 2.
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Table 7: Bivariate Relative Inequality Dominance Comparisons for Household Assets and Women’s Hemoglobin
Concentrations, Goa and Rajasthan
t-statistics for difference in the surfaces
3.47 -0.62 -1.30 -1.71 -2.06 -2.50 -2.55 -1.85 -0.76 -0.32 1.48
2.20 -0.37 -0.90 -1.15 -1.37 -1.61 -1.55 -1.09 -0.40 0.30 0.47
1.69 -0.10 -0.46 -0.56 -0.67 -0.75 -0.60 -0.16 0.34 0.77 0.40
1.28 0.28 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.40 0.66 1.14 1.67 2.12 1.66
Household Assets 1.01 0.46 0.41 0.54 0.63 0.82 1.04 1.44 1.87 2.27 1.89
0.83 0.40 0.46 0.62 0.67 0.78 0.90 1.15 1.44 1.73 1.43
0.67 0.26 0.35 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.31 0.35 0.44 0.57 0.21
0.52 0.00 0.15 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.17 -0.23
0.32 -0.93 -0.95 -0.86 -0.84 -0.83 -0.94 -0.98 -0.91 -0.97 -1.66
0.18 -0.68 -0.98 -0.97 -0.91 -0.83 -0.92 -0.91 -0.80 -0.93 -2.22
0.79 0.87 0.93 0.98 1.02 1.05 1.09 1.13 1.18 1.63
Hemoglobin Concentration
Source: 1999 DHS for India.
Notes:
The t-statistic tests the difference of Goa - Rajasthan, so a negative value indicates that Goa has less relative poverty than Rajasthan.
Poverty lines are set and differences are tested at normalized values of assets and hemoglobin found at each decile of the combined
samples.
Normalization is relative, i.e. data are divided by their means.
Dominance orders are (2,2).
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Absolute Inequality Dominance Comparisons for Household Assets
and Women’s Hemoglobin Concentrations, Goa and Himachal Pradesh
Goa Himachal Pradesh
Absolute Gini coefficients
Assets 0.506 0.443
Hemoglobin 0.922 0.896
Correlation 0.176 -0.008
Difference Between Dominance Curves
t-statistics for difference
Sample decile Assets Hemoglobin
0.1 8.06 2.09
0.2 9.22 2.03
0.3 10.40 2.02
0.4 11.15 1.99
0.5 11.24 1.92
0.6 11.04 1.80
0.7 10.01 1.66
0.8 7.76 1.50
0.9 5.97 1.38
Source: 1999 DHS for India.
Notes:
The t-statistic tests the difference of Goa - Himachal Pradesh, so a negative value indicates that Goa has less absolute inequality than
Himachal Pradesh.
Poverty lines are set and differences are tested at normalized values of assets and hemoglobin found at each decile of the combined
samples.
Normalization is absolute, i.e., means are subtracted from the data.
Dominance order is 3.
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Table 9: Bivariate Absolute Inequality Dominance Comparisons for Household Assets and Women’s Hemoglobin
Concentrations, Goa and Himachal Pradesh
t-statistics for difference in the surfaces
2.35 2.57 2.88 3.05 3.14 3.26 3.26 3.12 2.79 2.41 6.41
1.38 2.82 3.18 3.46 3.70 3.94 4.13 4.34 4.65 5.04 4.86
0.77 2.89 3.37 3.74 4.07 4.41 4.69 4.99 5.38 5.85 6.56
0.30 2.92 3.56 4.04 4.47 4.93 5.31 5.70 6.15 6.66 8.94
Household Assets 0.01 2.89 3.63 4.19 4.69 5.21 5.64 6.03 6.46 6.91 10.46
-0.19 2.82 3.62 4.21 4.73 5.28 5.72 6.12 6.53 6.96 11.06
-0.36 2.74 3.56 4.18 4.72 5.29 5.73 6.13 6.56 7.03 11.19
-0.56 2.53 3.36 3.98 4.50 5.05 5.47 5.83 6.19 6.58 10.88
-0.75 2.25 3.04 3.62 4.12 4.64 5.03 5.35 5.67 6.02 10.03
-0.90 1.99 2.68 3.24 3.74 4.24 4.63 5.00 5.42 5.91 8.96
-2.38 -1.39 -0.78 -0.28 0.22 0.62 1.02 1.52 2.12 6.81
Hemoglobin Concentration
Source: 1999 DHS for India.
Notes: The t-statistic tests the difference of Goa - Himachal Pradesh, so a negative value indicates that Goa has less absolute inequality
than Himachal Pradesh.
Poverty lines are set and differences are tested at normalized values of assets and hemoglobin found at each decile of the combined
samples.
Normalization is absolute, i.e., means are subtracted from the data.
Dominance orders are (3,3).
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Table 10: Summary of Cross-State Inequality and Welfare Dominance Comparisons for Household Assets and
Women’s Hemoglobin Concentration, India (325 comparisons)
Bivariate dominance
Second order Third order 2nd order, non-statistical
yes no yes no yes no
Relative Inequality
No univariate dominance in either dimension 0 74 0 36 0 3
Univariate dominance in both dimensions, consistent 26 31 37 57 123 37
Univariate results inconsistent 7 187 4 191 6 156
sub-total 33 292 41 284 129 196
Absolute Inequality
No univariate dominance in either dimension 0 176 0 91 0 16
Univariate dominance in both dimensions, consistent 10 20 64 31 87 66
Univariate results inconsistent 6 113 6 133 3 153
sub-total 16 309 70 255 90 235
Welfare
No univariate dominance in either dimension 1 44 1 37 0 9
Univariate dominance in both dimensions, consistent 90 24 94 27 167 18
Univariate results inconsistent 34 132 38 128 30 101
sub-total 125 200 133 192 197 128
Source: 1999 DHS for India .
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Table 11: Summary of Cross-State Inequality and Welfare Dominance Comparisons for Household Assets and
Student Math Test Percentile, Mexico (465 comparisons)
Bivariate dominance
Second order Third order 2nd order, non-statistical
yes no yes no yes no
Relative Inequality
No univariate dominance in either dimension 1 65 0 56 1 9
Univariate dominance in both dimensions, consistent 127 17 131 19 218 19
Univariate results inconsistent 28 227 25 234 14 204
sub-total 156 309 156 309 233 232
Absolute Inequality
No univariate dominance in either dimension 2 201 0 149 0 61
Univariate dominance in both dimensions, consistent 5 4 30 35 80 65
Univariate results inconsistent 26 227 8 243 3 256
sub-total 33 432 38 427 83 382
Welfare
No univariate dominance in either dimension 0 21 0 20 0 3
Univariate dominance in both dimensions, consistent 196 4 202 4 256 3
Univariate results inconsistent 37 207 44 195 30 173
sub-total 233 232 246 219 286 179
Source: ENLACE, Mexico.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
For sx = 1 and sy = 1 and for sx = 2 and sy = 1, the proof follows from
Theorems 1 and 2 in Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006). For sx = 2 and sy = 2,
start with
P (zx(y), zy) = −
∫ zx(zy)
0
pix(x, zy;λ
+) D0,0(x, zy) dx (20)
+
∫ zy
0
z(1)χ (y) pi
x(zx(y), y;λ
+) D0,0(zx(y), y) dy (21)
+
∫ zy
0
∫ zx(y)
0
pixy(x, y;λ+) D0,0(x, y) dx dy. (22)
Integrating (22) by parts with respect to x and y, and imposing the continuity
conditions characterizing the indices in Π2,2(λ+) in (10), we find:
P (zx(y), zy) = −
∫ zx(zy)
0
pixxy(x, zy;λ
+) D1,1(x, zy) dx (23)
+
∫ zy
0
z(1)χ (y) pi
xxy(zx(y), y;λ
+) D1,1(zx(y), y) dy (24)
+
∫ zy
0
∫ zx(y)
0
pixxyy(x, y;λ+) D1,1(x, y) dx dy. (25)
The rest of the proof follows from Theorem 1 in
Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006).
Proof of Theorem 2.
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Leaving out the superscript L for simplicity, we find
Dˆ −D =
∫ gχ(µˆχ)
0
∫ gξ(µˆξ)
0
h(χ, ξ; µˆχ, µˆξ)dFˆ (χ, ξ)−D (26)
=
∫ gχ(µχ)
0
∫ gξ(µξ)
0
h(χ, ξ; µˆχ, µˆξ)dFˆ (χ, ξ) (27)
+
∫ gχ(µχ)
0
∫ gξ(µˆξ)
gξ(µξ)
h(χ, ξ; µˆχ, µˆξ)dFˆ (χ, ξ) (28)
+
∫ gχ(µˆχ)
gχ(µχ)
∫ gξ(µξ)
0
h(χ, ξ; µˆχ, µˆξ)dFˆ (χ, ξ) (29)
+
∫ gχ(µˆχ)
gχ(µχ)
∫ gξ(µˆξ)
gξ(µξ)
h(χ, ξ; µˆχ, µˆξ)dFˆ (χ, ξ) (30)
−D. (31)
Expressions (28), (29) and (30) are of asymptotically lower order than (27) and
can thus be neglected. Expanding (27) and leaving out the terms of asymptotically
lower order, we find
Dˆ −D ∼= (32)
[µˆχ − µχ] g
′
χ(µχ)
∫ gξ(µξ)
0
h(gχ(µχ), y;µχ, µξ)dF (y |gχ(µχ))fx(gχ(µχ)) (33)
+ [µˆχ − µχ]
∫ gχ(µχ)
0
∫ gξ(µξ)
0
hµχ(χ, ξ;µχ, µξ)dF (χ, ξ) (34)
+ [µˆξ − µξ] g
′
y(µξ)
∫ gχ(µχ)
0
h(x, gξ(µξ);µχ, µξ)dF (x |gξ(µξ))fξ(gξ(µξ)) (35)
+ [µˆξ − µξ]
∫ gχ(µχ)
0
∫ gξ(µξ)
0
hµξ(χ, ξ;µχ, µξ)dF (χ, ξ) (36)
+
∫ gχ(µχ)
0
∫ gξ(µξ)
0
h(χ, ξ;µχ, µξ)d(Fˆ − F )(χ, ξ), (37)
where fχ and fξ are the univariate density of χ and ξ, respectively. Rearranging,
and defining mχ and mξ as in (18), we find:
Dˆ −D ∼= mχ
(
N−1
∑
χi − µχ
)
+mξ
(
N−1
∑
ξi − µξ
)
(38)
+
(
N−1
∑
I(χi ≤ gχ(µ
L
χ))I(ξi ≤ gξ(µ
L
ξ ))h(χi, ξi;µχ, µξ)
)
−D. (39)
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The existence of the appropriate population moments of order 1 lets us apply
the law of large numbers to (13) for each distribution A and B. This implies that
Dˆ is a consistent estimator of D. Given the existence of the population moments
of order 2, the estimator in (13) is root-N consistent by the central limit theorem,
and it is also asymptotically normal with asymptotic covariance matrix given by
Theorem 2. If the samples are dependent, then the covariance between the esti-
mator for A and for B is provided by Theorem 2 by setting L = A and M = B.
In the case that αx > 0 and αy > 0 for (7), the computation of mx simplifies
since h(gχ(µLχ), y;µLχ, µLξ ) = 0 (and similarly for my). In this case, for relative
inequality both in χ and in ξ, we have
g′χ(µχ) = zx
g′ξ(µξ) = zy
hµχ(χ, ξ;µχ, µξ) =
αxχ
µ2χ
(
zx −
χ
µχ
)αx−1
+
(
zy −
ξ
µξ
)αy
+
hµξ(χ, ξ;µχ, µξ) =
αyy
µ2
ξ
(
zx −
χ
µχ
)αx
+
(
zy −
ξ
µξ
)αy−1
+
.
(40)
For absolute inequality in χ and in ξ, we have
g′χ(µχ) = 1
g′ξ(µξ) = 1
hµχ(χ, ξ;µχ, µξ) = αx
(
1− χ−µχ
zx
)αx−1
+
(
1−
ξ−µξ
zy
)αy
+
hµξ(χ, ξ;µχ, µξ) = αy
(
1− χ−µχ
zx
)αx
+
(
1−
ξ−µξ
zy
)αy−1
+
(41)
and similarly for a combination of absolute and relative inequality.
The expressions for g′χ(µχ) and g′ξ(µξ) are the same if αx and/or αy equals 0,
but then hµχ and/or hµξ reduces to 0. In that case, there is however the complica-
tion of estimating
∫ gξ(µξ)
0
h(gχ(µχ), ξ;µχ, µξ)f(gχ(µχ), ξ)dξ in mχ (and similarly
for mξ). When αx = 0, this reduces to
∫ gξ(µξ)
0
h(gχ(µχ), ξ;µχ, µξ)f(gχ(µχ), ξ)dξ (42)
= F (ξ = gξ(µξ)|χ = gχ(µχ))fχ(gχ(µχ)), (43)
which is the distribution function of ξ at gξ(µξ) conditional on χ being equal to
gχ(µχ) times the density of χ at gχ(µχ). We can estimate this non-parametrically
by kernel weighting the values of the conditional distribution function of ξ at
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gξ(µξ) across values of χ, using weights that depend on the distance between χ
and gχ(µχ). To see this more clearly, let a bivariate kernel Ki(χ, ξ) be defined
as the product of two univariate kernels, h−1χ φ
(
χ−ξi
hχ
)
and h−1ξ φ
(
ξ−ξi
hξ
)
(both of
them integrating to 1 over χ and ξ), for each observation i = 1, ..., N . We can
then estimate (43) as
(Nhχhξ)
−1
∑
i
∫ gξ(µξ)
−∞
φ
(
gχ(µχ)− χi
hχ
)
φ
(
z − ξi
hξ
)
dz (44)
= (Nhχ)
−1
∑
i
φ
(
gχ(µχ)− χi
hχ
)
Φ
(
gξ(µξ)− ξi
hξ
)
, (45)
where Φ(z) =
∫ z
−∞
φ(u)du. In a bivariate setting, the approximately optimal
window for a Gaussian kernel and a multivariate normal density normalized to
unit variance is given by (1.25N)−1/6 — see Silverman (1986) for instance.
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Figure 1: Inequality frontiers
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Figure 2: Bistochastic transformations may increase inequality in well-being
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Figure 3: Inequality changesy
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